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ABSTRACT
Previous research has found that the income of divorced/separated
mothers who receive child support exceeds the income of those who do
not by more than the value of child support income, because women with
a child support award are more likely to work and to work longer hours
than women with no award. This paper analyzes the impact of child
support of AFDC participation and labor supply in a multiple regression
framework using the combined 1979/1982 Match Files of the CPS. It
attempts to correct for the fact that women with child support income
also differ in other ways (some observable and some not) from women
without child support. The results have policy implications for current
efforts designed to improve enforcement of existing child support
contracts and to increase the percentage of women due child support.
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I. Introduction
According to recent estimates, as of Spring 1984, there
were 8.7 million women in the United States living with
children under 21 years of age whose fathers were not living
in the household (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1985, Table
1) . The mean 198 3 total money income of these women was
$13,132 if child support was received from the children's
father, $8,433 if child support was due but not received,
and $7,389 if child support was not awarded. Among the
families with child support income, the average amount
received was $2,341. Thus, families with child support
income are better off financially than those without, and by
considerably more than the amount of child support received.
Unfortunately, many eligible women receive no child support:
Only 58 percent have a child support award and only 35
percent actually received some child support income in 1983.
The main reason that the overall income difference
between women who receive child support and those who do not
exceeds the value of the child support income is that women
awarded child support are more likely to work or work longer
hours than women not awarded child support. This was first
observed by Grossman and Hayghe (1982) and supported by more
recent work of Beller and Graham (1985), O'Neill (1985) and
Robins and Dickinson (1985) . In addition, Beller and Graham
demonstrate that among women due child support income, those
who receive the most are even more likely to work or to work
longer hours. At face value, these findings appear somewhat
surprising. It is well-known that AFDC income—a public
transfer—deters labor supply (Danziger, et al . 1981) . Why,
then, should child support income—a private transfer
—
encourage labor supply? Indeed, basic economic theory
suggests that all nonwage income should deter work effort.
What makes child support income appear to be different?
The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the
effect of child support income on hours worked of currently
divorced or separated mothers who head their own family,
roughly 4.7 million of the 8.7 million women eligible for
child support. (We exclude remarried and never-married
mothers from our analysis since their current living
arrangements and labor supply appear to be very different.)
The data set upon which our analysis is based is the
combined 1979 and 1982 March/April Match Files of the
Current Population Surveys, the surveys previous to the one
that forms the basis for the national estimates reported
above
.
Understanding the labor supply behavior of women with
and without child support income is important for those who
make public policy regarding welfare and child support.
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (1975) required all
states to establish programs to aid in the collection of
child support payments. In 1984 this was amended to require
states, among other things, to use expedited judicial and
administrative procedures to establish child support orders
and to withhold wages and intercept tax refunds to collect
overdue payments. If these efforts succeed, then several
important questions need to be addressed. First, what will
happen to the labor supply of those women already due child
support, if, on average, they receive more of the support
due them? Second, what will happen to the labor supply of
those mothers who suddenly obtain a child support award for
the first time? Finally, to what extent will all of this
reduce the reliance of these women on AFDC and other forms
of public assistance?
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II
examines the theoretical impact of child support income on
hours worked among women potentially eligible for AFDC
payments. Section III reviews the data used in the
empirical analysis. Section IV discusses various
econometric issues and presents estimates of the
determinants of labor supply, welfare participation and
child support income. Section V examines policy
implications of the empirical estimates and suggests an
agenda for future research.
II. A Theory of Labor Supply
A. With Child Support Income Exogenous
In a standard textbook theory of labor supply, the
impact of child support income on hours worked would be
unambiguous. In that theory, hours worked, H, depend upon
the market wage rate, W, and nonwage income, N:
(1) H = f(W, N(CS))
If leisure is a normal good, then H depends negatively upon
N. Child support, CS, is a component of nonwage income, and
therefore has a negative effect upon hours worked. It may,
however, have a somewhat different (that is, stronger)
effect than other forms of nonwage income, since child
support is not subject to income taxes.
Burtless and Hausman (1978) , Moffitt (1983) and Robins
(1984) , among others, argue that this standard theory needs
to be modified when it is applied to female family heads who
face the option of obtaining public assistance (AFDC, for
short)
. According to Burtless and Hausman, government
transfer programs such as AFDC introduce nonlinearities into
the budget set that "affect both the marginal wage and the
'virtual' nonlabor income [that is, nonwage income at H=0]
which the individual faces" (p. 1103) . Similarly, Moffitt
argues that the behavior of female family heads needs to be
modelled as "a two-equation demand system, representing the
joint choices of labor supply and participation in [AFDC]"
(p. 1024)
.
The AFDC program offers a woman an income guarantee, G,
(following the notation used by Moffitt) which varies with
her state of residence and family size. Actual AFDC
benefits received equal G - tWH - rN, where t is the
marginal tax rate on earnings and r is the tax rate on
nonwage income. It follows that benefits at zero hours of
work, G, equal G - rN. Thus, the labor supply theory of
equation (1) can be rewritten as:
(2) H = f (W(l-tP) , N + GP)
where P equals 1 if the woman participates in the AFDC
program and if she does not.
If P were exogenous, then equation (2) would represent
but a small and uninteresting variation on equation (1)
.
What makes it interesting is that P, itself, is a choice
variable. The decision whether or not to participate in the
AFDC program should depend upon whether utility is greater
with P=l or P=0. If utility depends upon total income and
leisure, then one can define the indirect utility function,
V, to be the value of utility obtained from substituting H
from equation (2) into the direct utility function. Then
the AFDC participation decision is a function of the utility
difference P*:
(3) P* = V(H given P=l) - V(H given P=0)
Because H is a function of wages and nonwage income,
equation (3) can be rewritten as:
(3') P* = V(W(l-t), G+(l-r)N) - V(W, N)
and the choice of P can then be written as:
(4) P = 1 if P* >
P = o if P* <
The choice of H and P is shown diagramatically in
Figure 1 for a woman who is potentially eligible for AFDC
(that is, for G > 0, or G > rN) . If the woman chooses not
to go on welfare, she faces the budget constraint L'N Y'.
If she chooses welfare, her budget constraint is L' (N+G) Y"
.
Thus, overall, her budget constraint is the kinked line
L' (N+G) BY'. If utility is maximized along the line segment
BY 1 , say at point E-^, she chooses not to go on welfare and
to work L'-H 1 hours. If utility is maximized along the line
segment (N+G) B, say at point E 2 , she goes on welfare and
works L'-H2 hours. Finally, if utility is maximized at
point (N+G) , she goes on welfare but does not work.
How does child support income affect labor supply?
From equations (2) - (4) it can be seen that an increase in
N (due to an increase in child support) has two effects:
first, according to equation (2) , an increase in N given P
reduces hours worked; second, according to equation (3'), an
increase in N lowers P* which, according to equation (4)
,
reduces welfare participation and, according to equation
(2) , increases hours worked. Thus, the effect of child
support on hours worked might be indeterminant empirically
in a sample composed of both AFDC participants and
nonparticipants. The reason is that women who receive child
support are likely to work less than those who do not and
are not AFDC participants, but more than those who do not
and are AFDC participants.
B. With Child Support Income Endogenous
Both the simple theory of labor supply in equation (1)
and the simultaneous equation model of labor supply and
welfare participation in equations (2) - (4) assume that
child support income is exogenous. This assumption has at
least some validity since it could be argued that a woman's
receipt of child support depends upon whether or not her ex-
husband pays support and how much he pays out of what he
owes. To the extent that his payment (or nonpayment) of
child support is unrelated to her behavior directly, or to
factors which affect her behavior, then child support income
may indeed be exogenous to her. However, there is
considerable evidence (Beller and Graham, 1985; O'Neill,
1985) that the receipt of child support is affected by
factors over which the woman has some control. In other
words, like labor supply and welfare participation, child
support is a choice variable.
Following Beller and Graham (1985) , we posit that the
amount of child support a woman receives depends upon her
ex-husband's ability (and desire) to pay, and upon the
amount of support due her. The amount of support due, in
turn, depends upon the financial needs of the woman and her
children, her ex-husband's ability to pay, and the legal
environment at the time of marital disruption. Thus, the
8amount of support she actually receives depends upon her own
actions (or factors that affect her behavior) both because
her actions affect whether or not she has a child support
award (and the value of that award) , and because her actions
may influence her ex-husband's willingness to pay the
support he owes. For example, she can decide whether or not
to make use of the services of the state's child support
(IV-D) office to help obtain an award and/or enforce
payment
.
The preceding discussion suggests the following
"reduced form" equation for child support received, CS
:
(5) cs = 9(Xobserved (H,P / . .) / Unobserved)
where x bserved ^s a vector of observable variables
reflecting her needs, his ability to pay, or the legal
environment, and xunobserved ^s a vector of unobservable
variables to be discussed below.
Among the observable factors which affect the amount of
child support income a woman receives may be her labor
supply (H) and public assistance status (P) . For example,
the amount of child support the courts award her may depend
upon her (anticipated) labor supply. Alternatively, her
husband's willingness to pay support may depend upon his
perception of her financial needs which he forms by
observing her welfare status or hours of work. Finally, it
may be that neither H nor P affect CS directly, but that
some other observable factors—such as her age and
education, or the number of children—influence all three
decisions. In either case, to determine the effect of CS
upon H and P, equations (2) -(5) must be estimated
simultaneously
.
There may be some important variables that affect the
amount of child support income received that are not
observable to the researcher. These could include the
financial well-being of the ex-husband, his emotional
attachment to his children, and the woman's self-
determination or initiative to either "make it on her own"
or "make sure he pays". As long as these unobservables have
no impact upon the woman's labor supply or welfare
participation decisons, then it is still possible to
estimate the impact of CS upon H and P. If, however, these
unobservable factors also affect H and P directly, then it
may not be possible to assess the true effect of CS on H and
P even in a simultaneous equation system.
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III. Description of the Data
The data sets upon which our empirical analysis is
based are the 1979 and 1982 March/April Match Files of the
Current Population Survey (CPS) . Special supplements to the
April 1979 and 1982 CPS were administered to all women 18
years of age and older (living with own children under 21
years of age whose father was not a member of the household)
to obtain information on marital history and the award and
receipt of child support and alimony payments. These data
were then matched with the woman's labor market, income and
demographic data from the March CPS. We combined both years
of data to obtain a sample of 4004 divorced or separated
female family (or subfamily) heads. Missing data reduce the
sample size to 3827 cases in the regressions reported below.
In the full sample of 4004 cases, 73 percent of the
women report being in the labor force in March of the survey
year (1979 or 1982) and report having worked an average of
1243 hours in the year prior to the survey. Mean total
personal income in 1978 dollars is $7,612. 28 percent of
the women received some income from public assistance (AFDC)
and 44 percent received some income from child support.
There are significant differences, however, between the 58
percent of the sample due child support and the 42 percent
not due child support in the year prior to the survey. The
March labor force participation rate is 80 percent for those
due support and only 63 percent for those not due support.
Mean hours worked are 1401 for the first group, and only
11
1022 for the second. Mean total personal income is $9029
among women due child support, but only $5631 among those
not due support. Furthermore, less than half of this
difference is accounted for by the $1314 of child support
received on average by those due support. Finally, 23
percent of those due child support and 35 percent of those
not due child support received some AFDC income.
The details of the construction of the AFDC variables
used in the analysis are described in Appendix C. To
summarize briefly, the annual income guarantee, G above or
AFDCMAX in the tables below, was obtained from official
government statistics for all states and family sizes.
Potential AFDC benefits at zero hours of work, G above or
AFDCEXP in the tables below, is obtained by subtracting all
personal nonwage income from the state's payment standard
(adjusted for family size) . This calculation assumes that
r, the tax rate on nonwage income, is 100 percent, which,
according to Robins (1984) , is the official tax rate in all
but two states. Fraker, Moffitt and Wolf (1985) present
estimates of effective tax rates and income guarantees for
1967-82, which differ substantially from official
statistics. We do not use their statistics because they
were not available for all 50 states in 1978 and 1981, and
because they differ rather markedly from other estimates
supplied by Robins (1984).
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IV. Empirical Analysis
A. Estimates of Labor Supply with Both Child Support and
AFDC Payments Assumed to be Exogenous
Table 1 presents OLS estimates of the determinants of
hours worked by divorced or separated female family heads
under the assumption that both welfare participation and
child support income are predetermined. HOURS equals annual
hours worked during the year prior to the survey, calculated
as weeks worked times average hours per week.
According to equation (2) , one determinant of labor
supply is a vector of personal characteristics intended to
reflect differences in preferences and wages across women.
This vector includes measures of her age, education, race,
location, family size and household composition. The other
determinant of hours worked is nonwage income, which is
disaggregated into AFDC, child support, alimony, and other
family income. We separate nonwage income into components,
because AFDC and child supports payments, unlike other forms
of income, are not subject to income taxes, and because of
our interest in assessing the effects of these two income
sources on labor supply. All variables are defined in
appendix Table A and their means and standard deviations are
presented in appendix Table B.
In each of the regressions, all variables representing
taste or wage differences are of the expected sign and are
usually significant. Women who are older (AGE, AGESQ) , more
educated (EDUC) , have previous work experience (PREVWORK) or
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older children (KIDS<3, KIDS<6, KIDS<18) , and are not black
(BLACK) are more likely to work longer hours than other
women. These variables tend to remain significant in all
regression tables and will not be discussed further.
Table 1 also includes measures of nonwage income.
Total nonwage family income excluding child support,
alimony, and AFDC payments (OTHER INC) has a negative and
significant effect on hours worked. So too does alimony
income (ALIMONY) , and its coefficient is even more negative.
This is consistent with the view of Becker (1981) that
alimony represents a payment to women who previously
specialized in work at home instead of work in the market.
Unlike other forms of nonwage income, child support
payments do not appear to reduce hours worked. In both
cols. (1) and (3) the coefficient on child support income
(CS) is positive, and in col. (3) it is statistically
significant at a one percent level. In cols. (2) and (4)
when a dummy variable indicating whether or not child
support is due (CSDUE) is added to the regression, the
coefficient on CS declines, although not enough to become
significantly negative. The coefficient on CSDUE is itself
positive and significant, indicating that women due child
support work more than those not due support.
The final type of nonwage income, AFDC income, is
captured in two different ways. In cols. (1) and (2) , a
dummy variable indicating whether or not the woman receives
any AFDC income (PA) appears along with benefits at zero
14
hours of work (AFDC, which equals AFDCEXP*PA) . As expected,
the coefficient on PA is very large and negative, indicating
that, ceteris paribus , women on welfare work 912 to 919
fewer hours per year than women not on welfare (who work on
average 1594 hours per year) . The coefficient on AFDC is
small and insignificant, so that among women on welfare,
differences in expected benefits appear to have no effect on
hours worked. Cols. (3) and (4) include a single measure of
welfare for all women—AFDCEXP—which equals potential AFDC
payments at zero hours of work, or G, as discussed in
section II above. Its coefficient is small and
insignificantly different from zero.
B. Estimates of Hours Worked and Welfare Participation
With Child Support Income Assumed to be Exogenous
In this section we continue to assume that child
support income is exogenous, but allow welfare participation
to be simultaneously determined with labor supply. Let PA
equal one if a woman received any AFDC income in the year
prior to the survey and zero otherwise. Estimates of the
determinants of PA (including a vector of a woman's personal
characteristics and state-specific AFDC eligibility
requirements) were obtained by maximum likelihood probit.
Probit coefficients, asymptotic T-ratios, and estimated
partial derivatives (see table footnotes for an explanation
of this calculation) are presented in Table 2.
According to these estimates, women are significantly
more likely to be welfare participants if they are black,
15
live in the northeast, live in a central city, or have more
children between the ages of 6 and 18. They are less likely
to be welfare participants if they live in the south, live
in the suburbs, are more educated, are older, live with
another adult, or are in a subfamily.
Nonwage income also affects welfare participation. The
larger is the AFDC guarantee provided by the state
(AFDCMAX) , the more likely a woman participates: each
additional $1000 raises the probability of her participation
by 4.7 percent. The larger is a woman's nonwage personal
income excluding child support (INCEXCS) , the less likely
she participates: each additional $1000 reduces the
probability of participation by 3 . 6 percent. Finally, child
support income also reduces welfare participation. Women
due child support (CSDUE) are 3.3 percent less likely to
choose AFDC than women not due support, and each $1000 of
child support received (CS) reduces this probability by an
additional 2.1 percent. Thus, compared to a woman not due
child support, a woman who receives $2000 of child support
is 7.5 percent less likely to be on welfare.
The theory presented in Section II suggests that
estimates of labor supply that take AFDC payments as given
will be biased when hours worked and welfare participation
are jointly determined. One way to obtain consistent
estimates would be to estimate the determinants of HOURS and
PA simultaneously, a procedure followed by Moffitt (1983)
.
Because PA is dichotomous while HOURS is continuous (but
16
truncated at zero) , conventional simultaneous equation
techniques are not appropriate. Instead, Moffitt uses a
nonlinear maximum likelihood method proposed by Heckman
(1978) and Lee (1979)
.
We use an alternative method of estimation. First, we
estimate separate hours regressions for welfare participants
(PA=1) and non-participants (PA=0) . These results are
reported in cols. (1) and (3) of Table 3c However, this
procedure introduces the well-known problem of sample
selection bias: estimates of the determinants of hours
worked will be biased unless we take explicit account of the
sample selection rule. We follow a two-step procedure
proposed by Heckman (1978, 1979) to eliminate this bias.
First, we use the probit coefficients (B) from the PA
regression reported in Table 2 to construct
(6) LAMPA =PA*f(XB)/F(XB) - (1-PA) *f (XB)/ (l-F(XB)
)
where X is the vector of determinants of PA, f is the
standard normal density function and F is the standard
normal cumulative distribution function. Second, we include
LAMPA as an additional regressor in the hours regressions.
These results appear in cols. (2) and (4) of Table 3.
Finally it should be noted that in the presence of sample
selection bias, OLS-generated standard errors are biased.
Heckman (1979) suggests a correction factor, which was
itself corrected by Green (1981) . However, in view of the
preliminary nature of our analysis, we make no attempt to
implement this cumbersome procedure.
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The labor supply behavior of welfare participants is
not well explained by the vector of independent variables in
cols. (1) and (2) . First, compared with the full-sample
estimates reported in Table 1, few personal characteristics
are now significant. Second, nonwage income appears to have
either no effect or a positive effect on hours worked.
Women due child support (CSDUE) work significantly more than
women not due support. However, one important determinant
of hours worked is LAMPA itself. From equation (6) notice
that LAMPA is a decreasing function of F(XB), the
probability of being on welfare. Thus the positive
coefficient on LAMPA suggests that women on welfare who are
the least likely to be in the welfare sample work longer
hours than women who are the most likely to be in the
welfare sample.
These same variables explain the labor supply of women
not receiving welfare much better, judging by the greater
number of significant coefficients and higher adjusted R2 in
cols. (3) and (4). All forms of nonwage income appear to
reduce hours worked, although the coefficient on child
support income received is not significant. As before,
women due child support (CSDUE) are likely to work longer
hours than those not due support. The large negative
coefficient on LAMPA suggests that women not on welfare who
are the most likely to be welfare participants (and thus
have the smallest LAMPA values) work more hours than women
who are the least likely to be welfare participants. In
18
other words, these potential welfare mothers are not on AFDC
because they have a high taste for work and income and/or a
low taste for welfare.
Heckman has argued that sample selection bias can be
viewed as the bias that arises from an omitted variable
(where LAMPA is the omitted variable in our case ) . Thus,
the estimated coefficients in cols (1) and (3) are biased,
while those in cols. (2) and (4) are unbiased. Our results
indicate that in a sample of AFDC participants the effect of
child support on hours worked will be biased upward unless
we account for the probability of being in the sample. The
bias is positive because women with child support income are
also the ones least likely to be in the sample (with the
largest values of LAMPA) , and most likely to be working.
Similarly, in the sample of AFDC nonparticipants, the effect
of child support on hours worked will be biased downward
unless we include LAMPA. From the probit results in Table 2
we know that women who do not have child support are the
most likely ones to be on AFDC, and thus from equation (6)
,
to have the smallest values of LAMPA. But, these women are
in the sample of AFDC nonparticipants because, ceteris
paribus , they also are the women most likely to work. Thus,
ignoring LAMPA, we underestimate the true effect of child
support on hours worked.
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C. Estimates of Hours Worked and Child Support Income With
Welfare Participation Assumed to be Exogenous
In this section we assume that welfare participation is
given, but that hours worked and child support are jointly
determined. Following Beller and Graham (1985) we use
maximum likelihood probit to estimate the determinants of
whether or not a woman is due child support in the year
prior to the survey. Let CSDUE equal one if child support
is due and zero otherwise. Determinants of CSDUE include a
vector of characteristics of each woman to capture her
financial needs and her ex-husband's ability to pay, and
measures of the legal environment at the time of the marital
disruption. Table 4 reports probit coefficients, asymptotic
T-ratios, and estimated partial derivatives.
According to these results, women are significantly
more likely to be due child support if they are more highly
educated, have previous work experience, have older children
or more children, live in the northcentral states, or live
in the suburbs. They are less likely to be due support if
they are black, are separated but not divorced, live in the
south, live in a central city, or are members of a
subfamily. The coefficients on TIME and LAW suggest that
since 1960 there has been a secular increase in the
probability of being due child support, but that since 1975
the increase has abated. Finally, the probability of being
due child support is affected by some forms of nonwage
income. The greater the amount of alimony received
(ALIMONY) , the more likely a woman is also due child
20
support. ALIMONY is probably an indicator of her ex-
husband's ability to pay and of her degree of specialization
in home production. Living in a state that offers more
generous AFDC income guarantees (AFDCMAX) reduces the
probability of being due child support. Generous AFDC
guarantees may discourage a woman from seeking an award.
Other forms of nonwage income appear to have no effect on
the probability of child support being due.
If CSDUE is determined by some of the same omitted
variables that determine HOURS, then the coefficient on
CSDUE in an hours regression will be biased. To obtain
consistent estimates of the effect of a "treatment" variable
(CSDUE, in our case) on a "choice" variable (HOURS) when
treatment is itself a matter of choice, Barnow et al (1980)
propose including LAMCS as an additional regressor in the
full-sample hours regression, where LAMCS equals:
(7) LAMCS = CSDUE*f (YA)/F(YA) - (1-CSDUE) *f (YA) / (1-F (YA)
)
and Y is the vector of determinants of CSDUE and A their
probit coefficients. Thus LAMCS is negatively related to
F(YA), the probability of being due child support.
Cols. (1) and (2) of Table 5 present regression
estimates of hours worked that take account of the
endogeneity of child support, by including the variable
LAMCS. The negative coefficient on LAMCS means that,
ceteris paribus , women whose characteristics assign them the
highest probability of being due child support (and thus the
smallest LAMCS values) work less than other women. These
21
regression results can be compared to the otherwise
identical (but biased) regressions in cols. (2) and (4) of
Table 1 that omit LAMCS. The most obvious difference is
that the unbiased estimate of the coefficient on CSDUE in
Table 5 is larger than the biased estimate in Table 1. The
bias occurs because we fail to control for the probability
of being due child support. From the coefficient on LAMCS,
we know that women not due child support who share similar
characteristics with women due support are already likely to
work long hours, so the actual receipt of child support
appears to have only a small positive impact on hours worked
in Table 1. But controlling for the probability of being
due child support, as in Table 5, we see that a woman due
support works up to 652 more hours annually than an
otherwise identical woman not due support.
It is important to add a caution in interpreting the
coefficient on CSDUE in Table 5. We are not controlling for
the probability of being on public assistance, as we did in
Table 3. Thus, part of the explanation for the seemingly
large effect of CSDUE on hours worked may be that women not
due child support are much more likely to obtain welfare
which reduces their incentive to work or to seek child
support.
To investigate the impact of dollars of child support
income received (CS) on hours worked, we estimate an hours
regression in col. (3) that is restricted to the sample of
women due support. While this introduces the possibility of
22
sample selection bias, notice that LAMCS in equation (7) is
exactly the "omitted variable" that Heckman • s procedure
would add to the regression to eliminate this bias. We
implement this procedure and report the results in col. (4).
Consistent with earlier findings, the large negative
coefficient on LAMCS suggests that, ceteris paribus , the
more likely a woman is to be due child support (the smaller
is LAMCS) , the more she works.
Theory predicts that the coefficient on CS in col. (3)
will be biased, but in practice the bias appears to be
rather small. Since LAMCS and CS are negatively correlated,
and since the coefficient on LAMCS in col. (4) is negative,
the direction of the bias is negative. In either column the
coefficient on CS, although negative, is extremely small and
statistically insignificant.
D. Simultaneous Equation Estimates of Hours Worked, AFDC,
and Child Support Income
Economic theory suggests that hours worked, AFDC
participation and child support income are jointly
determined, either because each decision is directly
affected by the other two, or because all three decisions
are affected by a commom set of variables. In this section
we estimate jointly the determinants of hours worked
(HOURS) , annual welfare payments received (PAAMT) , and
dollars of child support income received (CS) . Each of
these variables is continuous, but truncated at zero.
Nevertheless, as a first-approximation, we ignore the
23
truncation and employ conventional two-stage least squares
to estimate the simultaneous-equation system.
We postulate the following model:
(8.1) HOURS = h(Z, PREWORK, CS , PAAMT)
(8.2) PAAMT = p(Z, AFDCMAX, CS , HOURS)
(8.3) CS = C(Z, PATERNITY, CSVOL, SEPARATED, TIME, LAW,
PAAMT, HOURS)
where Z is a vector of variables common to all three
decisions such as a woman's age, education, race, and
residential location, and her nonwage income excluding AFDC
and child support. The complete list of variables contained
in Z appears in the footnote to Table 6. According to
equations (8.1) to (8.3), hours worked also depends upon
previous work experience (PREVWORK) , child support income
and public assistance income. In turn, public assistance
income is also a function of the state's income guarantee
for the given family size (AFDCMAX) , child support and
hours worked. Finally, child support income received also
depends upon the number of children from the absent father
(PATERNITY) , whether the child support award was voluntarily
agreed to or not (CSVOL) , whether the couple is divorced or
separated (SEPARATED) , the length of time since the marital
disruption (TIME and LAW)
,
public assistance income, and
hours worked.
PAAMT equals actual AFDC benefits received, not
potential benefits at zero hours of work—AFDCEXP or AFDC in
our previous tables. For women on welfare who do not work,
all three variables should be the same. For women on
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welfare who do work, however, PAAMT is less by the value of
earnings times the tax rate on earned income. Thus, while
PAAMT is clearly affected by HOURS, our theoretical
discussion in section II shows that HOURS are affected by
AFDCEXP, not PAAMT. This means that the hours regression
postulated above is incorrect. However, this specification
is used since it simplifies the analysis considerably.
Table 6 presents two sets of estimates of the system of
equations in (8) using two-stage least squares (TSLS) . The
odd number columns exclude the variable CSDUE from the
vector Z, while the even number columns include it. That
is, while the amount of child support income received is
clearly endogenous, whether or not any support is due is
assumed to be exogenous. Cols. (1) and (2) report estimates
of hours worked which can be compared with the OLS results
in Tables 1, 3 and 5 that include an almost identical set of
independent variables (the difference being that PAAMT
replaces either AFDCEXP or AFDC and PA, as discussed above)
.
Cols. (3) and (4) report estimates of public assistance
income received which can be compared with the probit
estimates in Table 2 of AFDC participation. Cols. (5) and
(6) report estimates of child support income received which
can be compared with the probit estimates in Table 4 of
whether or not child support is due.
With a few notable exceptions, the results in cols. (3)
to (6) are consistent with the earlier probit results.
Factors that increase the likelihood of participating in
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AFDC or being due child support also increase the amount of
such income received. Only one variable—CSDUE—changes
sign: according to the probit estimates, women due child
support are significantly less likely to be on public
assistance, but according to the simultaneous equation
estimates these women receive significantly more AFDC
income. Notice, however, because of the large negative
coefficient on CS in col. (4), women due child support who
receive more than $845 in payment (that is, 395.89/468.48)
will receive smaller AFDC benefits. One additional result
of some note based on the estimates of child support income
in cols. (5) and (6) : although the estimated coefficients
on HOURS and PAAMT are negative, they are not statistically
significant. In otherwords, there is at best slight
evidence that ex-husbands pay less child support to women
who work more or receive higher welfare benefits.
There is a remarkable consistency between the OLS and
TSLS coefficients in the HOURS regressions. OTHER INC and
ALIMONY significantly reduce hours worked, and their
estimated coefficients remain quite stable with changes in
econometric technique. In the TSLS estimates the
coefficient on PAAMT is large and negative, indicating that
a woman on AFDC who receives the average amount of public
assistance income ($2514) works 515 to 566 fewer hours per
year than an otherwise similar woman who receives no such
income. This effect is somewhat smaller than that suggested
by the OLS coefficients on PA and AFDC.
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It is instructive to compare the various estimates of
the coefficients on the two child support variables. In the
TSLS the coefficient on CSDUE is larger than its Table 1 or
3 estimates, but smaller than the estimate in Table 5. In
col (2) of Table 6, a woman due child support works 22
hours more per year than her otherwise identical counterpart
due no support. The most significant difference from
previous findings is that the coefficient on CS in col. (2)
of Table 6 is no longer positive or statistically
insignificant, but negative and significant at a 10 percent
level: Each $1000 increase in child support payments
received reduces labor supply by 88 hours, or roughly three
times as much as OTHER INC. This finding is consistent with
the hypothesis that child support income should have a
stronger effect than other nonwage income since child
support receipts are nontaxable. Finally, taking the
coefficients on CSDUE and CS together, a woman due child
support who receives the average amount ($1328) works 102
hours more per year than an otherwise identical woman not
due child support.
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V. Policy Implications
The goal of this paper was to attempt to answer two
basic policy questions. First, how will the labor supply of
women already due child support (and consequently the
economic well-being of their families) change if current
efforts to increase their receipt of child support payments
succeed? Second, how might the labor supply of women
without a child support award change if a support order is
obtained on their behalf? We conclude the paper by
summarizing our answers to these two questions.
The first question is much easier to answer than the
second. According to our estimates, among women due
support, a $1000 increase in the amount of child support
income received would reduce annual labor supply by as much
as 88 hours (Table 6) , as little as 4 hours (Table 1) , or
among women on public assistance, actually increase it by 24
hours (Table 3) . We place our greatest confidence in the
TSLS estimate in Table 6 since the result is consistent with
predictions of economic theory and the estimation technique
simultaneously accounts for the endogeneity of public
assistance and child support. Thus, we conclude that
efforts to increase child support payments will ultimately
increase the financial well-being of the woman and her
family by less than the amount of child support received
since hours worked and consequently earnings will decline.
It is more difficult to predict the labor supply
response of women who have no child support award to their
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being awarded (and then receiving) child support. If women
who are not due child support do not differ in unobservable
ways from women who are due child support, then we can use
our coefficients on CSDUE and CS to predict their effect on
HOURS . Suppose that a woman without a child support award
suddenly obtains one and receives $1328 in payment, the
average amount received among those due any. We would
predict that her annual labor supply increases by anywhere
from 102 hours (Table 6) to 192 hours (Table 1)
.
What if women who are not due child support differ in
unobservable ways from women who are due child support?
Indeed, in attempting to explain who is due and who is not
due child support in Table 4, a large unexplained variation
remains: the reported R" between observed and predicted
values of CSDUE is only .207. Furthermore, based upon an F-
test comparing the labor supply of women due child support
(Table 5) to the labor supply of women not due child support
(results not shown) , we can reject the hypothesis of
equality of the corresponding coefficients. In other words,
the two groups appear to be drawn from different
populations. This means that we may not be able to use the
experience of the first group (women due child support) to
predict the behavior of the second.
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Table 1
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Selected Factors on
Hours Worked (with T-Ratios in Parentheses)
Independent
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
EDUC 52.17 50.74 78.60 76.75
(10.25) (9.98) (14.07) (13.76)
AGE 21.25 20.62 29.85 28.77
(2.47) (2.40) (3.11) (3.01)
AGESQ -0.34 -0.32 -0.40 -0.38
(3.19) (3.05) (3.43) (3.24)
KIDS<3 -127.76 -124.03 -167.05 -164.13
(3.40) (3.30) (3.98) (3.93)
KIDS<6 -51.85 -49.74 -104.31 -100.87
(1.93) (1.85) (3.49) (3.39)
KIDS<18 -27.03 -29.53 -86.44 -92.29
(2.20) (2.40) (6.25) (6.68)
BLACK* -122.77 -100.74 -211.34 -183.51
(3.76) (3.07) (5.84) (5.04)
PREVWORK* 510.40 504.78 667.43 659.45
(21.16) (20.96) (25.43) (25.19)
CSDUE* • • 125.60
(4.70)
• • 166.32
(5.51)
PA* -912.01
(18.79)
-919.36
(18.99)
•
•
OTHER INC -24.39 -24.10 -16.36 -15. 17
(/1000) (6.79) (6.73) (4.00) (3.72)
ALIMONY -63.69 -61.50 -52.17 -47.83
(/1000) (5.20) (5.03) (3.81) (3.50)
CS 12.05 -3.65 35.45 19.26
(/1000) (1.42) (0.40) (3.34) (1.76)
AFDCEXP
• , # -3.63 8.92
(/1000) (0.31) (0.76)
AFDC 6.88 12.22 . , , ,
(/1000) (0.47) (0.83)
Adj R2 .451 .454 .320 .325
Sample Size 3827 3827 3827 3827
* Indicates a dummy variable with yes=l and no=0
.
Note: Each regression also includes the variables YEAR82, NCENTR,
NEAST, SOUTH, SMSA, CC, AGESQ, SPANISH, NADULT, and SUBFAM.
Variable definitions appear in Appendix Table A.
Table 2
Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimates of the
Effect of Selected Factors on the
Probability of Welfare Participation
Independent
Variable
Probit
Coefficient
Asymptotic
T-Ratios
Partial
Derivative**
YEAR82* .017
SPANISH* .026
BLACK* .351
NEAST* .209
NCENTR* .122
SOUTH* -.201
SMSA* -.198
CC* .322
KIDS<
3
.037
KIDS<6 .234
KIDS<18 .173
EDUC -.141
NADULT -.091
AGE -.053
AGESQ .0004
AFDCMAX(/1000) .218
INCEXCS(/1000) -. 167
CS(/1000) -.096
CSDUE* -.150
SUBFAM* -.473
CONSTANT 1.571
0.32
0.27
5
2
1
2
3
4
4
6
2
1
6
6
4
2
5
4
12
90
69
12
09
70
49
24
09
12.15
2.09
83
73
91
78
58
66
21
18
004
006
076
045
026
044
043
070
008
051
038
031
020
012
00009
047
036
021
033
103
* indicates a dummy variable with yes=l and no=0.
** Probit coefficient times .217 which equals F(BX) where B
is the vector of probit coefficients, X is the vector of sample
means of the independent variables, and F is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function.
Table 3
The Effect of Selected Factors on Hours Worked by
Welfare Status (with T-Ratios in Parentheses)
Independent AFDC Participants
(1) (2)
Not on AFDC
Variables (3) (4)
EDUC 40.31 14.21 53.73 69.14
(4.63) (0.95) (8.66) (9.49)
AGE -18.84 -30.90 29.47 39.98
(1.24) (1.92) (2.77) (3.66)
AGESQ 0.13 0.22 -0.42 -0.52
(0.68) (1.14) (3.33) (4.00)
KIDS<3 -96.54 -93.56 -175.86 -172.28
(1.94) (1.88) (3.30) (3.24)
KIDS<6 -61.97 -24.93 -69.11 -91.91
(1.69) (0.62) (1.86) (2.45)
KIDS<18 2.69 41.58 -37.54 -64.20
(0.13) (1.55) (2.42) (3.82)
BLACK* -56.11 11.62 -124.39 -168.80
(1.06) (0.19) (3.00) (3.95)
PREVWORK* 388.61 385.54 536.56 536.56
(8.82) (8.76) (18.75) (18.80)
CSDUE* 118.91 103.99 132.88 155.26
(2.80) (2.43) (3.95) (4.57)
OTHER INC -3.35 -5.99 -27.47 -23.42
(/1000) (0.36) (0.64) (6.94) (5.. 75)
ALIMONY 151.53 138.59 -61.38 -53.99
(/1000) (1.58) (1.44) (4.79) (4.19)
CS 24.29 9.99 -14.42 -6.43
(/1000) (1.42) (0.54) (1.33) (0.58)
AFDC 32.59 61.29 a . . .
(/1000) (1.87) (2.80)
LAMPA
•
• 316.49
(2.16)
• •
-459.49
(4.00)
Adj R2 .164 .167 .230 .234
Sample Size 1084 1084 2743 2743
See footnotes to Table 1.
Table 4
Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimates of the
Effect of Selected Factors on the
Probability That Child Support Is Due
Independent Probit Asymptotic Partial
Variable Coefficient T-Ratios Derivative**
YEAR82* -.132 2.49 -.079
SPANISH* -.111 1.26 -.067
BLACK* -.476 7.53 -.286
NEAST* -.010 0.15 -.006
NCENTR* .166 2.47 .100
SOUTH* -.164 1.97 -.099
SMSA* .132 2.34 .079
CC* -.157 2.59 -.094
KIDSO -.035 0.48 -.021
KIDS<6 -.066 1.27 -.040
KIDS<18 .097 3.40 .058
EDUC .056 5.73 .034
NADULT -.079 1.72 -.047
AGE .026 1.56 .016
AGESQ -.0004 2.00 -.0002
SUBFAM* -.161 1.97 -.097
ALIMONY(/1000) .110 3.54 .066
OTHER INC(/1000) .004 0.60 .002
AFDCMAX(/1000) -.077 2.58 -.046
PREVWORK* .094 2.03 .056
PATERNITY .077 2.42 .046
SEPARATED* -.792 15.77 -.476
TIME .051 6.10 .031
LAW -.061 3.62 -.037
CONSTANT -.970 2.68
•
•
* indicates a dummy variable with yes=l and no=0
.
** Probit coefficient times .601. See notes to Table 2
Table 5
Estimates of the Effect of Selected Factors on Hours
Worked For All Women and Women Due Child Support
(with T-Ratios in Parentheses)
Independent All Women Women Due.
(3)
Child Support
Variables (1) (2) (4)
EDUC 41.76 64.79 54.94 44.99
(7.71) (10.88) (7.90) (6.06)
AGE 16.55 24.11 16.40 8.99
(1.92) (2.54) (1.32) (0.72)
AGESQ -0.25 -0.30 -0.23 -0. 11
(2.39) (2.52) (1.46) (0.69)
KIDS<3 -108.03 -146. 10 -182.23 -168.56
(2.87) (3.50) (3.52) (3.26)
KIDS<6 -38.05 -84.03 -22.58 -7.54
(1.42) (2.82) (0.63) (0.21)
KIDS<18 -40.93 -109.08 -20.32 -32.52
(3.28) (7.73) (1.20) (1.89)
BLACK* -11.82 -66.12 -190.61 -86. 14
(0.31) (1.58) (3.98) (1.56)
PREVWORK* 485.46 634.69 460.58 438.31
(19.92) (23.97) (14.97) (14.03)
CSDUE* 488.23
(5.98)
652.09
(7.12)
•
•
PA* -917.10 , , -921.67 -917.84
(18.99) (14.41) (14.39)
OTHER INC -24.46 -14.98 -24.25 -24.60
(/1000) (6.85) (3.70) (5.22) (5.31)
ALIMONY -73.04 -62.02 -64.74 -76. 13
(/1000) (5.87) (4.48) (4.83) (5.56)
CS -2.82 23.58 -4.80 -4.41
(/1000) (0.31) (2.15) (0.51) (0.47)
AFDCEXP
, , 17.86
(/1000) (1.50)
AFDC 13.52 • • 23.97 27. 10
(/1000) (0.92) (1.12) (1.27)
LAMCS -237.80 -315.58
. .
-280.36
(4.70) (5.60) (3.76)
Adj R2 .457 .330 .411 .415
Sample Size 3827 3827 2266 2266
See footnotes to Table 1
Table 6
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of Hours Worked,
AFDC Income, and Child Support Payments
(with T-Ratios in Parentheses)
Independent HOURS PAAMT CS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OTHER INC -23.15 -21.41 -36.81 -34.73 12.09 12.23
(/1000) (6.00) (5.53) (6.74) (5.85) (1.48) (1.58)
ALIMONY -81.10 -27.49 3.17 66.07 313.13 300.11
C/1000) (4.85) (1.40) (0.13) (2.12) (12.68) (12.92)
CSDUE 219.59
(3.77)
395.89
(4.21)
1059.30
(21.20)
HOURS • • • • -58.52 -63.55 -13.85 -14.06
(/100) (11.18) (11.00) (1.27) (1.37)
PAAMT -204.65 -225.02 • • , # -86.29 -41.67
(/1000) (4.58) (5.05) (0.80) (0.41)
cs 77.82 -88.29 -259.75 -468.48 . . . .
(/1000) (2.31) (1.84) (5.74) (6.46)
PREVWORK 570.92
(17.92)
550.92
(17.14)
• • • • • • •
AFDCMAX • • 257.09 264.96 • • •
(/1000) (11.32) (10.71)
PATERNITY • • 206.54
(6.93)
188.58
(6.71)
CSVOL • • • • 747.75
(13.60)
461.01
(8.82)
SEPARATED
•
• • • • • -210.21
(3.95)
74.80
(1.44)
TIME • • • • • • 30.69
(3.82)
16.10
(2.13)
LAW • • • -21.41
(1.28)
3.53
(0.22)
Note: Each regression also includes the variables YEAR82,
SPANISH, BLACK, NEAST, NCENTR, SOUTH, SMSA, CC, KIDS<3, KIDS<6
KIDS<18, EDUC, SUBFAM, NADULT, AGE, and AGESQ.
Appendix Table A
Definition of Variables
EDUC = number of years of school completed by the women.
SPANISH = 1 if woman is of Spanish origin and otherwise.
BLACK = 1 if the woman is Black and otherwise.
NEAST = 1 if woman lives in the northeast and otherwise.
NCENTR = 1 if woman lives in the northcentral states and
otherwise.
SOUTH = 1 if woman lives in the south and otherwise.
SMSA = 1 if woman lives in an SMSA and otherwise.
CC = 1 if woman lives in the central city of an SMSA and
otherwise.
PATERNITY = number of children under 21 fathered or adopted
by ex-husband living with their mother.
AGE = woman ' s current age
.
AGESQ = age squared
CSVOL = 1 if child support was awarded voluntarily and
otherwise.
YEAR82 = 1 if observation is from the 1982 Match File and
if from the 1979 Match File.
SEPARATED = 1 if woman is currently separated and if she
is divorced
TIME = last two digits of divorce or separation year minus
60, or if marital disruption occurred before 1961.
LAW = last two digits of divorce or separation year minus
74, or if marital disruption is before 1975.
KIDS<i = number of children less than i years old
(1=3,6,18)
.
PREVWORK = 1 if woman was working in 1975 (1979 Match File)
or if woman was working at the time of her
marital disruption (1982 Match File) ; else 0.
PA = 1 if AFDC income was received and otherwise.
CSDUE = 1 if child support is due and otherwise.
SUBFAM = 1 if woman and her children live as a subfamily
and otherwise.
NADULT = number of adults in the household in which the
woman and her children reside.
HOURS = annual hours worked in 1978 or 1981
LAMPA = correction for public assistance sample selection
bias. See equation (6) in the text.
LAMCS = correction for child support sample selection bias.
See equation (7) in the text.
INLFNOW = 1 if the woman was in the labor force during the
March survey week and otherwise.
[Note: the following variables are measured in 1978 dollars
by deflating the 1981 values by 1.40]
OTHER INC = total family income in year prior to the survey
excluding a woman's own earnings, AFDC income,
child support and alimony.
CS = child support income received in year prior to survey.
ALIMONY = alimony income received in year prior to survey.
PAAMT = AFDC income received in year prior to survey.
INCEXCS = total personal income in year prior to survey
excluding earnings, AFDC income and child
support.
AFDCMAX = maximum AFDC benefits paid by the state, adjusted
for family size. See appendix C.
AFDCEXP = expected AFDC benefits at zero hours of work. See
appendix C.
AFDC = AFDC * PA
Append i x Table B
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Selected Variables
Non Women Due
Variable Fu 1 1 Samp 1
e
AFDC Women AFDC-Women Ch ild Support
(N=3827) (N=2743) (N=1084) (N=2266)
YEAR82
. 55
. 57
. 50
. 55
(.50) (.49) (.50) (.50)
SPANISH .08 .06
. 12 .06
(.27) (.24) (.33) (.24)
BLACK
. 21
. 17
. 31
. 13
(.41) (.38) (.46) (.34)
NEAST
. 21
. 19
. 28
. 20
(.41) (.39) (.45) (.40)
NCENTR
.23 .22 .26
. 27
(.42) (.42) (.44) (.44)
SOUTH
.31
. 34
. 21
. 27
(.46) (.47) (.41 ) (.44)
SMSA
. 61
. 60 .63
. 59
(.49) (.49) (.48) (.49)
CC
.32 .28
. 42
. 26
(.47) (.45) (.49) (.44)
KIDS<3
. 17
. 11 .30
. 14
(.42) (.34) (.56) (.39)
KIDS <6 .42 .31
. 71
. 39
(.68) (.56) (.86) (.65)
KIDS<18 1. 72 1. 51 2. 24 1 . 74
(1. 13) (1.03) (1.22) (1.03)
EDUC 11.87 12. 30 10.77 12.29
(2.53) (2.44) (2.42) (2. 34)
NADULT 1. 37 1.41 1 . 27 1 32
(.71) (.74) (.64) (.66)
AGE 35. 80 36.89 33.05 35. 37
(9. 28) (9. 32) (8.60) (8. 36)
AGESQ 1367. 61 1447. 29 1165. 98 1 320. 69
(731 .04) (749. 17) (640. 47) (640. 98)
CS 786.61 937
. 62 404. 50 1328.49
(1484. 46) (1529. 93) ( 1286. 38) ( 1 732. 67 )SUBFAM
.08
.09
. 07
. 07
(.28) (.29) (.25) (.26)CSDUE
. 59 .64 .48
(.49) (.48) (.50)
ALIMONY 159.11 213.76 20. 82 228. 22
(970.04) (1133.95) (205.01 ) (1149.91)OTHER INC 2044. 70 2438. 38 1048. 54 1964. 76
(4064. 80) (4416. 70) (2755. 98) (401 7. 94 )PREVWORK
.50 .59
. 28
. 54
(.50) (.49) (.45) (.50)
Appendix Table B (continued)
Variabl e Full Sample
(N=3827)
Non —
AFDC Women
(N=2743)
AFDC-Women
(N=1084
)
Women Due
Child Support
(N=2266)
AFDC
AFDCEXP
PA
HOURS
AFDCMAX
INCEXCS
PATERNITY
SEPARATED
TIME
LAW
LAMCS
LAMPA
1NLFN0W
CSVOL
PAAMT
818
(1548
1945
(1572
(
1262
(943
3005,
(1294
822
(2302,
1
(
(
15
(5
2
(2
94
40)
08
31)
28
45)
33
53)
7
5)
20
50)
86
94)
33
47)
46
11)
94
65)
00
.74
(-44)
.24
(.18)
704. 13
(1373.79)
(0)
1594
(818
13
00)
—
. 31
(-22)
.87
(.34)
2891 . 20
(1572. 62)
422. 74
(683.02)
.88
(.48)
.41
(.49)
577
(1290
00
59)
.23
( 42)
1415.61
(902. 06)
54
30)
Appendix C
Description of the AFDC Variables Used in the Analysis
The variables AFDCMAX and PAYSTD for 1978 were obtainedfrom U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(1979), Tables 6 to 10. AFDCMAX equals the monthly amount
of the largest payment for AFDC (times 12) by number of
recipients and state. The number of recipients is
determined by adding one adult plus the number of children
under the age of 20. PAYSTD equals the monthly amount of
the payment standard (times 12) by number of recipients and
state. For 1981 AFDCMAX and PAYSTD were obtained from U. S.
Department of Health and Human Service (1981), Tables 17 and
18 •
The following procedure was used to create AFDCEXP,
potential AFDC benefits at zero hours of work:
Let AFDCPOT = (PAYSTD
-(INCEXCS + CS) )
If AFDCPOT < 0, then AFDCPOT =
IF AFDCPOT < AFDCMAX, then AFDCEXP = AFDCPOT
IF AFDCPOT > AFDCMAX, then AFDCEXP = AFDCMAX
where INCEXCS equals total personal income excluding
personal earnings, public assistance income received, and
child support received. CS equals child support received.
PAAMT equals actual public assistance income received.
If PAAMT exceeds zero, then PA equals 1. If PAAMT equals
zero, then PA equals zero.
Finally, AFDC = AFDCEXP*PA. In otherwords, AFDC equalspotential AFDC benefits at zero hours of work for those who
receive some public assistance income.
All 1981 figures were deflated by 1.40.
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